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292 Abstract
Does taxation structure have an impact on investment dynamics? In our paper we 
evaluate the share of tax revenues in GDP and investment outcomes, making use of 
gross fixed capital formation as a proxy for investment. This empirical analysis is 
carried out for all OECD countries, during the period of 1980-2015, to assess the 
tax system composition effects in both the short- and the long-run. Resorting to 
panel data econometric techniques, the paper also aims to find optimal tax-invest-
ment threshold values. Our results lead us to conclude that there is a maximising 
effect of income taxation on investment growth when revenues from this tax source 
are about 10.7%. Furthermore, we find that revenues from social security contribu-
tions are detrimental to growth, in both the short- and the long-run, while tax rev-
enues from firms and consumption are only detrimental in the short-run.
Keywords: investment growth, tax systems, fiscal policy, optimal taxation
1 INTRODUCTION
Since Adam Smith shared thoughts and reflections of an economic nature in The 
Wealth of Nations, it has become clear that investment is fundamental for eco-
nomic development. Nowadays, be they academics or not, everyone recognises 
the validity of this hypothesis quite nonchalantly. Investment is promoted as a 
guarantee of long-run growth, is seen almost as an input for an economic unit to 
be able to function perfectly, in a sustainable way.
In fact, investment enables sustainable consumption in the long-run, by applying 
economic productive factors in both old and new economic production processes. 
This allows us to create not only more products for exchange in markets, but also 
more opportunities to intensify the trade of previous investments. This is because 
investment decisions can improve the older production processes through effi-
ciency gains, allowing the creation of more added value.
On the other hand, the existence of the state can jeopardise investment decisions. 
For when a government levies taxes on the private side of the economy, in effect 
it reduces both private consumption and investment. Taxation can jeopardise 
investment decisions, particularly when the increase in revenues of both income 
and consumption taxes from the private-side of an economy can both lead to a 
reduction in the level of aggregate consumption and also decrease investment 
profitability rates through the reduction of the expected aggregate demand for the 
outcomes of these investments.
It is also true that funds raised from taxes are spent through government consump-
tion and investment. Furthermore, apart from the fact that the main purpose of 
taxes is to guarantee sufficient funds to conduct various fiscal policies, taxes are 
also levied on economic agents to correct for externalities that arise from the pro-
duction process. In this case, taxes play a kind of a broker role for any nefarious 
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293such as the environment, for example. Additionally, taxes can stimulate certain 
production process behaviours which present good externalities for the economy, 
as in the case of investment in human capital for the production process.
On the other hand, from a macroeconomic perspective, the utility of taxation can 
be positively justified. When investment levels are beyond the optimal level, i.e. 
they are not in accordance with an optimal consumption balanced path, it is imper-
ative to promote the reduction of investment decisions. This happens when the 
condition of economic dynamic efficiency is not verified, i.e. when the return rate 
on capital exceeds investment growth rates. Put more specifically, a non-optimal 
level of investment is verified when the marginal product of capital is less than the 
economic growth rate – as illustrated in several economic exogenous growth theo-
ries, such as, for instance, in Solow (1956); Swan (1956) and Ramsey (1928); 
Cass (1965); Koopmans (1963). In contrast to this perspective, when investment 
levels are below the optimal level required to guarantee a sustainable growth path, 
one point of view is that government intervention is required – through public 
spending and an increase in investment. In fact, there is empirical evidence sus-
taining the argument that an increase in public investment can lead to crowding-in 
effects in private investment, and, therefore, lead to increases in aggregate invest-
ment levels (Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2009). 
Furthermore, several tax arrangements can have a decided impact on investment 
decisions. If governments decide to levy less tax on individual income, for exam-
ple, this may lead to increase aggregate demand for both durable and non-durable 
goods which may not only give rise to higher profits but provide new investment 
opportunities. Moreover, when fiscal authorities decide to change corporate tax 
rates, they influence several branches of economic activity. In particular, tax ben-
efits can lead to specialization in economic activities with higher added-value for 
the overall economy. Additionally, tax rises on consumption, on property and 
social security contributions lead generally to a reduction of current consumption. 
These tax policies may impact on movements of interest rates, depressing them 
and promoting investment decisions, in general. 
According to the analysis above, we think that it is essential to analyse the effects 
of taxation on investment dynamics. Is it possible empirically to find a correlation 
between taxation structure and investment dynamics outcomes? In particular, is 
there a relationship to be found between each source of tax revenue and GDP and 
investment performance? These questions point up the importance of studying the 
way in which investment is influenced by fiscal policy. We recognise that this 
issue has already been studied in depth; however, academic researchers have 
mainly studied this relationship from the angle of the spending side of fiscal pol-
icy. We therefore think that it is important to revisit the investment – fiscal policy 
relationship looked at from the revenue side of fiscal policy. Accordingly, when 
taking it into consideration that tax revenues are reintroduced into the economic 
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294 the tax structure – investment connection. On the other hand, we are aware that the 
macroeconomic study of taxation has not taken into account the particularities of 
each tax incidence, or any other tax exemptions or tax law particularities capable 
of explaining the different degrees of compliance of each tax, in each country 
under analysis. However, having decided to develop this study from a macroeco-
nomic perspective, we think that an optimal structure of taxation can result in a 
better design of each tax. In specific terms, we believe that our research is a good 
starting point for studying taxation analysis in more depth, and for being able to 
reach, at the same time, a higher rate of tax compliance, resulting in greater effi-
ciency and reliability from the microeconomic perspective – ensuring the much-
needed revenues that governments require to conduct their policies.
Our results lead us to conclude that there is an investment threshold with respect to 
some tax revenue sources. In particular, with the exception of taxes on individual 
income, an increase of revenues from tax sources seems to be detrimental to invest-
ment dynamics. Furthermore, even though we achieve a maximizing effect of 
almost 11% of revenues from individual income taxes, in GDP terms, in the short-
run, we do not find evidence for optimal thresholds for income tax in the long-run.
This study is organised into the following sections: section 2 provides a brief 
review of the existing literature on the causalities of taxation on investment; sec-
tion 3 highlights the applied methodology and also the databases used in this 
analysis; section 4 details the obtained results, and, lastly, section 5 summarises 
our conclusions.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature on taxation is vast. With respect to the impact of taxation 
on economic performance, it is particularly worth mentioning the studies con-
ducted in Lee and Gordon (2005), where the authors evaluate the tax structures 
and their impact on economic growth for a set of 70 countries over the last three 
decades of twentieth century, concluding that while their results point out the neg-
ative impact of corporate taxes on growth, labour income taxes are not significant 
for economic performance. This negative result regarding the impact of corporate 
taxes on growth is also confirmed by Arnold (2008), assessing 21 OECD coun-
tries’ tax structures over a period of more than 30 years. On the opposite side, this 
author concludes that taxation of property and consumption enhances growth 
more, which is also in accordance with Xing’s (2010) results. In fact, this author 
also concludes that levying taxes on income, both individual and corporation, as 
well as on consumption is associated with lower long-term per capita GDP. Lastly, 
Grdinic, Drezgic and Blazic (2017) assess the correlation between economic evo-
lution and tax composition in Central and Eastern European countries, concluding 
that taxation arrangements present different effects than those in the existing lit-
erature investigating the effects of taxation in OECD countries. In specific terms, 
the authors claim there is a negative impact of all taxation on growth, underlining 
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295In respect of the relationship between taxation and investment, this subjects has 
also been deeply studied from different perspectives in economics. In fact, some 
of the literature has highlighted the impact of tax policies on investment behav-
iour, especially corporate income tax and its effects on investment decision-mak-
ing processes. For instance, a study conducted by Da Rin, Sembenelli and Di 
Giacomo (2010) makes use of panel data techniques to assess the impact of taxa-
tion on firms for a set of more than 2.5 million firms in 17 European countries, 
during the period of 1997-2004. The authors conclude that a corporate tax reduc-
tion is related with a decreasing capital-labour ratio, and, specifically, the impact 
of corporate taxes is stronger on capital than on labour. However, as the authors 
point out, a tax reduction is desirable for the promotion of the entry of firms into 
the market – however, this policy can also favour the entry of less-financially 
robust firms. The same conclusion regarding the effect of corporate taxation and 
market entry is reached in Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2014), where the authors 
verify that a 10% reduction in corporate taxation increases market entry by 3%. 
Complementing the previous conclusions, research conducted in Da Rin, Di Giac-
omo and Sembenelli (2011) concludes that there is a non-linear relationship 
between tax and firm entry into the market.
On the other hand, in a study of 14 developed countries during the period of 1982-
2007, Bond and Xing (2015) find a negative relationship between taxes on firms 
and their effects on a firm’s capital – output ratios. The authors develop an econo-
metric specification derived from a constant elasticity of substitution in a neoclas-
sical model of investment, finding in both short- and long-run that a 1% increase 
in a firm’s taxation has a negative impact on capital-output ratios of between 
-0.3% and -0.7%. These results are also corroborated by Djankov et al. (2010) for 
a sample of 85 countries in 2004. Additionally, these authors also found that, with 
respect to the tax effects on industries, manufacturing is more exposed than other 
segments to the detrimental effects of corporate taxation. These conclusions are 
also reached in Mukherjee, Singh and Žaldokas (2017).  However, besides finding 
a negative correlation between taxes on corporate income and R&D activities, the 
authors also conclude that higher taxes result in a reduced supply of new goods 
and services into the market economy. Furthermore, by analysing the effects of 
consumption taxes on corporate investment decisions, Jacob, Michaely and Mül-
ler (2017) conclude that this source of taxation is also detrimental to a firm’s 
investment policy. The results reached by the authors led to the conclusion that the 
detrimental effect of consumption taxation is stronger for firms with a higher 
degree of demand elasticity, besides having a higher exposure to domestic final 
consumers and to financial restrictions. 
With regards to the effect of taxation on firm size and ownership, Galindo and 
Pombo (2011) find that corporate taxes affect big firms more than small and 
medium sized firms, regarding investment decisions and productivity. In addition, 
Brandstetter and Jacob (2013) apply a difference-in-differences approach to assess 
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296 heterogeneous responses – i.e. a cut in corporate tax can lead to growth in invest-
ment for domestically-owned firms higher than that of foreign-owned corpora-
tions. However, Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) found that tax progressivity 
tends to stimulate market entry more in low-to-average income than in high-
income individuals.
With regards to the productivity-tax linkage, empirical research carried out by 
Gemmell et al. (2016) for a set of 11 European countries between 1996 and 2005 
concludes that while higher statutory corporate tax rates impact the productivity 
levels of small firms negatively, the productivity of bigger firms is only affected 
by effective marginal tax rates. Additionally, Langenmayr, Haufler and Bauer 
(2015) highlight the fact that the existence of an optimal corporation tax structure 
depends on the degree of competition.  The authors conclude that when the degree 
of market competition is low, higher taxes favour firms with high productivity. 
Conversely, when the degree of competition is in alignment with competitive mar-
ket conditions and firms’ taxes on profit are low, then low-productivity firms tend 
to be favoured.
Another topic is tax burden and its relationship with risk-taking decisions for 
firms’ investment. On this subject, Ljungqvist, Zhang and Zuo (2017) conclude 
that the response to a tax change is not symmetric. In fact, the results suggest that 
a tax increase is accompanied by a reduction in R&D, among other activities. The 
authors also conclude that only low financial leverage firms react to tax cuts when 
it comes to risk-increasing investment decisions. In addition, a study carried out 
by Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2016) on the effect of corporate taxation on 
employment and income in the United States, between 1970 and 2010, concluded 
that while a reduction in corporate taxes has little impact on economic growth, tax 
cuts during an economic contraction can bring about an increase in both levels of 
employment and income.
From the macroeconomic perspective, several studies also assessed the effects of 
fiscal policies on investment dynamics. In particular, an empirical study was car-
ried out by Vergara (2010) to assess the linkage between tax reforms and invest-
ment dynamics for the case of Chile, between 1975 and 2003. The paper’s conclu-
sion is in accordance with the theoretical predictions regarding the tax-investment 
relationship – namely that a reduction of corporate income tax led to a boost in 
investment in Chile. Furthermore, the author also discovered two channels that 
explain the negative correlation between taxes and investment: one is related with 
the positive correlation between higher tax rates and capital costs, and the other is 
related to higher taxes with liquidity constraints derived from a reduction of the 
availability of internal funds to promote investment. Additionally, Romer and 
Romer (2010) evaluated the dynamics of post-WWII tax changes in investment 
for the United States, and found that the negative sensitivity of investment to 
positive tax changes is quite large. In fact, on a quarterly basis, investment seems 
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297much greater than the sensitivity of both GDP and consumption to tax increases. 
Furthermore, Mertens and Ravn (2012) evaluate the impact of both anticipated 
and unanticipated tax shocks for the U.S. economy, making use of VAR econo-
metric techniques for the second-half of the 20th century. Their conclusions follow 
the theoretical predictions – and the authors highlight the important role of antici-
pated tax shocks for the dynamics of several economic issues.
On the other hand, Mountford and Uhlig (2009), resorting to the same economet-
ric techniques, conclude that not only is there a negative response of investment 
to an increase in fiscal revenues, but also that a public budget deficit crowds out 
investment, which is also corroborated in Barro and Redlick (2011). Additionally, 
and besides coming to the same negative conclusions about the investment-taxes 
nexus, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) reached the conclusion that fiscal consolida-
tion via taxation is more detrimental than via the spending side. In fact, raising 
taxes is more likely to produce economic recessions, and a more inefficient con-
trol of government deficit and debt dynamics when compared with fiscal adjust-
ment via cuts in government expenditures.
Finally, Afonso and Jalles (2015) evaluate the impact of fiscal policy on invest-
ment for a large panel of 95 countries, during 38 years. While the authors find that 
private investment evidences a negative correlation with social security spending 
for all OECD countries, they also found that interest payments and subsidies have 
detrimental effects on both public and private investments. It is thus clear that the 
study of taxation structure and investment dynamics can provide new insights 
leading to the promotion of the latter without hampering government in its imple-
mentation of fiscal policies.
3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In order to empirically study the impact of taxation on investment growth, we deter-
mined that investment dynamics is a function of taxation composition. More 
 specifically, the share of each tax revenue source, as a percentage of GDP, is denoted 
by T, of the ∆I = F(T) type, as detailed in equation (1). Furthermore, we make use of 
gross fixed capital formation growth rate as a proxy for investment growth.
  (1) 
where ∆Ii,t is the investment growth rate (annual or 5-years average), yi,t –1 is the 
one-lag real per capita GDP, τn,i,t represents the revenue of each tax item n, in GDP 
terms, xi,t represents the set of control variables, vi and ηt are, respectively, the 
country and time-specific effects, and εi,t is the error term of the white noise-type.
Additionally, and in order to assess the existence of non-linear effects of taxation 
structure on investment decisions, we decided to introduce a squared term, as 
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  (2) 
Therefore, by deriving equation (2) in respect for each tax component, τn,i,t, as 
expressed in equation (3), and by then equalising the derivative function to zero, 
as detailed in equation (4), we can obtain each tax item threshold in respect to 
investment growth:
  (3) 
  (4)
Therefore, if we obtain a significant negative signal for β3,i,t, we thus have a con-
cave relationship between a tax item and the investment dynamic, which trans-
lates into an optimal value for that tax source to maximise investment. On the 
other hand, a convex relationship through a positive coefficient for β3,i,t translates 
into a value that hampers investment growth decisions. Therefore, in the empirical 
results section, when we obtain non-linear relations, we then highlight each coef-
ficient to differentiate between maximum and minimum optimal levels.
The model computed in this paper considers the period between 1980 and 2015, 
for all the OECD countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), 
Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), the Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Esto-
nia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hun-
gary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), 
South Korea (KOR), Latvia (LVA), Luxembourg (LUX), Mexico (MEX), the 
Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portu-
gal (PRT), the Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN),  Spain (ESP), Sweden 
(SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), the United Kingdom (GBR) and the 
United States (USA). 
The database used in our analysis includes data from several sources: PPP per 
capita GDP (realgdppc); public debt (debt) and total government spending (tot-
exp) – both as a ratio of GDP, output gap, as a percentage of potential GDP (out-
putgap) are all obtained from the World Economic Outlook (IMF). On the other 
hand, taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals (taxinc), as well as 
taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporates (taxfirms), social security 
contributions (ssc), taxes on payroll and workforce (taxpayroll), taxes on property 
(taxprop), taxes on goods and services (taxvat), gross fixed capital formation 
(gfcf) and its growth rate (gfcfgr) were all retrieved from the OECD.Stats data-
base. Age dependency ratio, as a percentage of active population (ageratio), and 
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299(foreigninvestment), and GDP percentage of household final consumption expend-
iture (hconsggdp) are all collected from World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Population in millions (pop) and the real total factor productivity (rtfpna) were 
obtained from the data of Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015). Lastly, the liquid 
liabilities-to-GDP ratio (llgdp) is based on International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
from the IMF. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for each variable used in our 
regressions.
For the estimation of the coefficients, we resort to panel data techniques, applying 
the OLS, OLS-Fixed Effects (FE), by resorting to the Hausman Test to evaluate if 
the respective specification should be run with fixed effects1, Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) and Robust Least Squares (RLS) resorting to the M-estima-
tion technique.
With the exception of RLS, all these estimations assume the white diagonal covar-
iance matrix hypothesis. Additionally, we estimate both equations (1) and (2) for 
both annual and 5-year average growth rates. Lastly, we only discuss the existence 
of a threshold when the coefficients of each tax item present statistical signifi-
cance for both linear and square term tax regressors, for a minimum of 90% con-
fidence interval.
Table 1
Summary statistics of the variables set for investment regressions, 1980-2015
 realgdppc taxinc taxfirms ssc taxpayroll taxprop
Mean  24.448 8.82 2.806 8.345 0.369 1.745
Std. dev. 14.313 4.635 1.500 4.981 0.728 1.003
Max   101.054  26.780 12.594 19.173 5.661 7.334
Min   2.184 0.873 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.074
Obs.  1,195 1,106 1,106 1,137 1,137 1,137
 taxvat gfcf gfcfgr depositrate ageratio debt
Mean  10.588 23.161 3.314 9.253 51.287 55.728
Std. dev. 3.046 4.091 8.917 25.364 6.931 35.901
Max      18.730 39.404 45.119  682.530 96.457 242.113
Min   2.979 11.546 -47.761   -0.180 36.323 3.664
Obs.  1,137 1,174 1,164 1,055 1,260 943
 foreigninvestment rtfpna totexp pop hconsggdp outputgap
Mean  3.645 0.941 42.621 33.531 56.382 -0.319
Std. dev. 10.487 0.123 9.657 52.235 7.069 2.850
Max   252.308 1.539 68.436 319.449 79.551 14.911
Min   -58.323 0.472 14.244 0.228 29.918 -11.437
Obs.  1,120 1,173     977 1,173 1,174 851



















































43 (3) 291-309 (2019)
300 4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON INVESTMENT DYNAMICS
The short-run analysis for equation (1), i.e. without the tax items square terms, 
show that tax burden has, in general, a negative impact on investment dynamics. In 
detail, a unit increase in the tax burden of individual income taxes is associated 
with a decrease of 0.14%, approximately, while an increase in the tax on firms’ 
revenues, as a proportion of GDP, presents a negative elasticity greater than the 
unity (-1.15), on average. Moreover, revenues of social security contributions also 
show an average reduction of -0.66% by a percentage point increase in this tax 
source. In fact, these obtained results are expected: taxes levied on household 
income and on social security contributions reduce aggregate demand and, there-
fore, they reduce the demand for goods and services, which can decisively influ-
ence new investment decisions. On the other hand, it is certain that a rise in the tax 
burden on these two sources can indicate wage rises, which cut into firm profits, 
decreasing the expected returns of previous investments, as well as of any new 
investments. Furthermore, a rise of taxes on firms, controlled by the cyclical condi-
tions of the economy, also reduces the expected present value of future investment, 
leading investors to postpone their decisions to promote capital growth and, there-
fore, the aggregate level of investment. For the same reasons, the negative coeffi-
cients obtained for taxes on consumption of goods and services as well as for taxes 
on property are expected in line with traditional economic theory. Yet, and if we 
admit that the increase of revenues from taxes on consumption results from changes 
in tax rates, the price system will incorporate those tax policy changes, reducing 
investment opportunities. In fact, even if firms can accommodate a higher tax rate 
without changing their prices, the net profits will necessarily decrease, increasing 
the time required for an investment decision to result in a profit.
With regards to the control variables, we also find the expected signs. Specifically, 
a rise in deposit interest rates may be a sign of a consequent increase in lending 
interest rates, if bank entities decided to keep their spreads. In that sense, an 
upward movement of deposit rates is associated with a decrease of investment of 
about 0.4%. On the other hand, we conclude that there is a surprisingly negative 
impact of foreign investment on aggregate investment decisions. However, the 
magnitude of this effect is very small, representing a negative impact of no more 
than 0.08% on aggregate investment growth by an increase of a percentage point 
of foreign investment. In fact, this result needs to be more accurately explored. 
This result may arise from the substitution and complementary degree between 
aggregate investment and foreign investment. Furthermore, household consump-
tion seems to be detrimental to investment growth, which can be explained by the 
reduction of savings and consequently fewer funds being available for capital 
allocations and other investment decisions. 
Looking in detail at the government debt growth impact, it seems that this variable 
crowds out aggregate investment. On the other hand, while there is no evidence 
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301investment decisions, and the output gap is revealed to be procyclical with gross 
fixed capital formation – ranging between 0.27% and 0.74%. This positive effect 
can be explained by the fact that when the economy is overheating, inflation pres-
sures tend to decrease the amortization time of the investment, and, consequently, 
to increase its profitability.
With regards to tax item thresholds for investment decision-making, through the 
use of the growth rate of gross fixed capital formation, it is possible to verify the 
non-existence of these thresholds for both taxes on payrolls and taxes on property. 
Regarding the other tax items, we obtained a value of 10.65% for taxes on indi-
vidual income on GDP, which translates to the maximum value that promotes 
investment, while we see minimizing values on average of 12.09% for social 
security contributions, and of 7.37% and 14.18% for tax on firms and consump-
tion, respectively. The values of these last three tax items evidence their minimum 
revenue, as a proportion of GDP, which is required to promote growth in invest-
ment. The above-mentioned results are presented in table 2.
Table 2
Linear and non-linear short-run impact results of taxation structure on investment 
decisions
 OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆realgdppc
0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc–1
-0.144** -0.069 0.131 1.491** -0.127 0.037 -0.128** -0.182
(0.070) (0.215) (0.199) (0.577) (0.112) (0.367) (0.061) (0.175)
taxinc2–1
-0.007 -0.070** -0.015 -0.001
(0.009) (0.031) (0.017) (0.008)
taxfirms–1
-0.442** -1.580*** 0.277 -0.595 -0.561*** -3.859*** -0.289** -1.032**
(0.176) (0.568) (0.272) (0.779) (0.263) (1.488) (0.140) (0.427)
taxfirms2–1
0.107** 0.070 0.279** 0.066*
(0.044) (0.060) (0.115) (0.039)
ssc–1
-0.121** -0.436** -0.047 -2.007** -0.151 -0.703 -0.086* -0.276
(0.058) (0.209) (0.230) (1.013) (0.095) (0.437) (0.050) (0.180)
ssc2–1
0.017 0.083** 0.028 0.010
(0.011) (0.039) (0.021) (0.010)
taxpayroll–1
-0.324 0.420 1.990** 3.002 -0.065 -2.013 -0.284 0.107
(0.262) (0.929) (0.968) (1.904) (0.381) (1.546) (0.277) (0.934)
taxpayroll2–1
-0.365 -0.304 0.729 -0.144
(0.356) (0.540) (0.682) (0.383)
taxprop–1
-0.571* -0.588 -0.211 0.775 -0.036 3.822 -0.013 1.139
(0.295) (1.025) (0.508) (1.521) (0.649) (2.793) (0.255) (0.770)
taxprop2–1
0.042 -0.118 -0.658 -0.208
(0.166) (0.214) (0.443) (0.141)
taxvat–1
-0.612*** -2.640*** 0.413 0.291 -0.103 -2.691* -0.663*** -1.982***
(0.163) (0.635) (0.363) (1.127) (0.3) (1.519) (0.133) (0.538)
taxvat2–1
0.099*** 0.016 0.111 0.066**
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302  OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
gfcf–1
-0.521*** -0.615*** -1.283*** -1.337*** -0.077 -0.340 -0.505*** -0.599***
(0.104) (0.123) (0.148) (0.159) (0.111) (0.208) (0.072) (0.079)
gfcfgr–1
0.242*** 0.242*** 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.429** 0.267 0.259*** 0.257***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.183) (0.169) (0.032) (0.032)
∆depositrate
-0.426* -0.435* -0.436* -0.414* 1.063 -1.323 -0.583*** -0.606***
(0.241) (0.238) (0.256) (0.251) (1.233) (1.526) (0.160) (0.159)
ageratio–1
-0.016 -0.053 -0.065 -0.029 -0.044 -0.029 -0.027 -0.058
(0.067) (0.071) (0.137) (0.144) (0.116) (0.104) (0.053) (0.055)
∆debt
-0.275*** -0.303*** -0.189** -0.200** -0.487* -0.543** -0.264*** -0.295***
(0.078) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) (0.258) (0.218) (0.047) (0.047)
rtfpna
-12.705*** -12.809*** -6.562 -2.947 2.829 -0.873 -10.328*** -10.345***
(3.769) (3.884) (5.536) (6.308) (4.246) (5.567) (2.677) (2.770)
∆totexp–1
-0.148 -0.160 -0.088 -0.081 0.315 -0.139 0.053 0.032
(0.159) (0.163) (0.154) (0.157) (0.654) (0.602) (0.104) (0.104)
log(pop)
-0.497 -0.580 61.785*** 63.702*** 0.228 -0.501 -0.926*** -0.997***
(0.397) (0.396) (10.841) (11.771) (0.878) (0.974) (0.237) (0.243)
foreigninvestment–1
-0.075*** -0.066*** -0.070*** -0.066*** 0.028 0.009 -0.075*** -0.073***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.087) (0.091) (0.015) (0.015)
hconsumption–1
0.039 0.013 -0.214** -0.242** 0.07 0.000 0.036 0.024
(0.027) (0.028) (0.093) (0.094) (0.048) (0.049) (0.027) (0.028)
outputgap
0.369** 0.466*** 0.690*** 0.736*** -0.849** 0.121 0.271*** 0.352***
(0.157) (0.157) (0.159) (0.170) (0.395) (0.565) (0.091) (0.093)
Tax thresholds 
taxinc – – – 10.65% – – – –
taxfirms – 7.38% – – – 6.92% – 7.82%
ssc – – – 12.09% – – – –
taxpayroll – – – – – – – –
taxprop – – – – – – – –
taxvat – 13.33% – – – – – 15.02%
R2 0.540 0.554 0.680 0.687 0.343 0.477 0.401 0.414
DW-Stat 1.856 1.875 2.000 2.018 2.110 1.949 n.a. n.a.
Obs.  529 529 529 529 473 473 529 529
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The robust standard errors are in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order 
to assume residual heteroskedasticity, with the exception of the RLS technique. The DW-statistic 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively, maximum and 
minimum levels of optimal tax items.
3.2. LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON INVESTMENT DYNAMICS
From a long-run perspective, with regards to linear relationships between tax rev-
enues and investment (see Regressions (9), (11), (13) and (15)), the results 
obtained highlight patterns similar to those verified for short-run effects on tax 
items and investment growth, the exception being property tax – which appears to 
be irrelevant for determining investment decisions in the long run. In addition, we 
can observe that the values presented in tables 2 and 3 highlight similar magni-
tudes for the coefficient of taxation items in investment growth.
Regarding the other control variables, as in the short-run perspective, we find that 
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303tion and output gap variables highlight a non-clear effect on investment dynamics, 
as these last two variables also present different signals, depending on the econo-
metric technique used.
Nevertheless, it seems that deposit interest rates have a negative effect on invest-
ment from a long-term perspective. For example, a 1 p.p. increase in deposit inter-
est rates tends to lead to a decrease in investment of between 0.4 p.p. and 0.6 p.p., 
approximately. Furthermore, government spending variation also seems to gain 
importance in the long term – presenting a slightly negative impact on gross fixed 
capital formation.
With regards to the analysis of the non-linear relationships of tax items on invest-
ment decisions, by computing the consequent existing tax items-to-investment 
thresholds, we find maximum values of 6.27% and 9.19% for taxation on firms’ 
profits and for consumption taxes, respectively. By contrast, we find a minimum 
threshold value for social security contributions of 11.35%. In the long run, and 
similarly to what we can observe in the short-run analysis, we can also conclude 
for the non-existence of any threshold values for payroll taxes. The above-dis-
cussed results may be observed in detail in table 3.
Table 3
Linear and non-linear long-run impact results of taxation structure on investment 
decisions
 OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
∆realgdppc
0.000** 0.000**     0.003*** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc–1
-0.042 -0.085 0.131 0.740 -0.127 -0.263 -0.128** 0.021
(0.051) (0.091) (0.199) (0.571) (0.112) (0.169) (0.061) (0.114)
taxinc2–1
0.003 -0.042 0.012* -0.004
(0.004) (0.029) (0.007) (0.005)
taxfirms–1
-0.098 -0.197 0.277 0.489 -0.561** -0.601 -0.289** -0.828***
(0.107) (0.458) (0.272) (0.747) (0.263) (0.734) (0.140) (0.278)
taxfirms2–1
0.014 -0.028 0.041 0.066***
(0.034) (0.053) (0.055) (0.025)
ssc–1
-0.069** -0.227** -0.047 -0.417 -0.151 -0.150 -0.086* -0.255**
(0.034) (0.091) (0.230) (0.662) (0.095) (0.172) (0.050) (0.117)
ssc2–1
0.010* 0.008 0.006 0.009
(0.005) (0.023) (0.010) (0.006)
taxpayroll–1
-0.168 0.170 1.990** 1.156 -0.065 0.221 -0.284 -0.164
(0.160) (0.490) (0.968) (1.352) (0.381) (0.986) (0.277) (0.608)
taxpayroll2–1
-0.215 -0.467 -0.334 -0.044
(0.185) (0.503) (0.415) (0.249)
taxprop–1
-0.258 -0.971 -0.211 -0.816 -0.036 -1.381 -0.013 0.447
(0.181) (0.868) (0.508) (1.838) (0.649) (1.260) (0.255) (0.501)
taxprop2–1
0.137 0.122 0.190 -0.052
(0.124) (0.219) (0.198) (0.092)
taxvat–1
-0.271** -0.183 0.413 1.985*** -0.103 0.298 -0.663*** -0.499
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304  OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
taxvat2–1
-0.007 -0.108*** -0.040 0.022
(0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.017)
gfcf–1
-0.114* -0.100 -1.283*** -0.259*** -0.077 0.096 -0.505*** -0.083
(0.062) (0.069) (0.148) (0.091) (0.111) (0.115) (0.072) (0.052)
gfcfgr–1
0.274*** 0.267*** 0.225*** 0.214*** 0.429** 0.265*** 0.259*** 0.292***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.061) (0.036) (0.183) (0.100) (0.032) (0.021)
∆depositrate
-0.648*** -0.644*** -0.436* -0.468*** 1.063 -0.388 -0.583*** -0.573***
(0.124) (0.191) (0.256) (0.131) (1.233) (0.815) (0.160) (0.104)
ageratio–1
-0.064 -0.053 -0.065 -0.052 -0.044 0.089** -0.027 -0.071**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.137) (0.112) (0.116) (0.045) (0.053) (0.036)
∆debt
-0.239*** -0.238*** -0.189** -0.150*** -0.487* -0.631*** -0.264*** -0.245***
(0.050) (0.057) (0.082) (0.041) (0.258) (0.124) (0.047) (0.031)
rtfpna
-4.849** -4.240* -6.562 0.082 2.829 1.089 -10.328*** -4.070**
(2.074) (2.551) (5.536) (4.644) (4.246) (3.229) (2.677) (1.803)
∆totexp–1
-0.046 -0.050 -0.088 0.002 0.315 0.517 0.053 -0.125*
(0.091) (0.077) (0.154) (0.079) (0.654) (0.327) (0.104) (0.068)
log(pop)
-0.436** -0.421 61.785*** 14.650** 0.228 -0.203 -0.926*** -0.415***
(0.189) (0.299) (10.841) (7.225) (0.878) (0.391) (0.237) (0.158)
foreigninvest-
ment–1
-0.004 -0.002 -0.070*** -0.006 0.028 0.044 -0.075*** -0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.009) (0.087) (0.047) (0.015) (0.010)
hconsumption–1
0.056*** 0.053*** -0.214** -0.093 0.070 0.057** 0.036 0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.093) (0.102) (0.048) (0.028) (0.027) (0.018)
outputgap
-0.144* -0.138 0.690*** -0.085 -0.849** -0.433 0.271*** -0.214***
(0.083) (0.103) (0.159) (0.091) (0.395) (0.312) (0.091) (0.061)
Tax thresholds 
taxinc – – – – – – – –
taxfirms – – – – – – – 6.27%
ssc – 11.35% – – – – – –
taxpayroll – – – – – – – –
taxprop – – – – – – – –
taxvat – – – 9.19% – – – –
R2 0.476 0.481 0.717 0.730 0.171 0.180 0.360 0.366
DW-Stat 1.124 1.127 1.034 1.095 1.692 1.665 n.a. n.a.
Obs.  529 529 529 529 473 473 529 529
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The robust standard errors are in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order 
to assume residual heteroskedasticity, with the exception of the RLS technique. The DW-statistic 
is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively, maximum and 
minimum levels of optimal tax items.
Lastly, based on the results presented in table 1, which allow a comparison of the 
short- and long-term results for each tax item from the econometric regressions, 
we are also able to conclude that a certain fiscal space exists to raise some taxes. 
In fact, with the exception of payroll taxes and property taxes, we have found 
optimal values for the other tax sources. In detail, we derived maximum threshold 
levels for income taxes, in the short run, and corporate taxes, over the long term, 
in order to promote higher investment growth rates.  In fact, and by comparing the 
optimal values reached with the mean values of table 4, we can state that we can 
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305we can raise tax revenues from corporate income by 3.5 p.p., in the long-term. 
Moreover, there is no incentive to change the tax burden in the short-term, since 
the optimal average value (7.37%) represents a minimizing threshold. Therefore, 
if fiscal policy intends to raise taxes from firms, it will jeopardize investment deci-
sions in the short-term. This conclusion is also valid for social security contribu-
tions, for both short- and long-run analysis, and also for taxes on consumption, 
only for a short-run perspective. Moreover, as we can observe, as the average 
value of consumption taxes, as a proportion of GDP, is above the optimal thresh-
old value, there is an incentive for fiscal policy to reduce the tax burden on this tax 
source to efficiently promote gross fixed capital formation.
Furthermore, and as a concluding reflection exercise, we can obtain optimal tax 
structures. Indeed, if we sum the values of all the optimal threshold tax items with 
the historical average recorded for taxes, we conclude that taxation as a share of 
GDP should be around 46.41% and 37.75% in the short-run and long-run, respec-
tively. Lastly, table 4 summarises our main findings regarding average tax thresh-
old values.
Table 4
Summary of tax items threshold values for investment decisions
 Short-run (%) Long-run (%) Mean (%)
taxinc 10.65 –  8.82
taxfirms  7.37  6.27  2.81
ssc 12.09 11.35  8.35
taxpayroll – –  0.37
taxprop – –  1.75
taxvat 14.18  9.19 10.59
Notes: the non-bold and bold values, presented in the short-run and long-run columns express 
maximum and minimum optimum levels, respectively. The values expressed in italics represent 
average values.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Investment is a crucial dimension of economic science, as it guarantees not only 
consumption in the long run, but also a sustainable growth path. However, we are 
aware that there are many other factors that can influence the dynamics of invest-
ment within the various economies under study. One of these factors is taxation: 
besides the taxes levied on firms’ profits, taxes affect several economic aggregates 
that may impact decisively on investment decisions. Additionally, taxation is rec-
ognised a priori as being detrimental to investment. Therefore, our goal is to dis-
entangle the relationship between tax systems and investment dynamics.
In detail, it can be seen that in this study we have developed an empirical model 
to assess both linear and non-linear correlations between tax compositions in 
terms of GDP, investment, which is proxied by gross fixed capital formation. 
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306 sources led us to conclude the existence of optimal tax item revenue thresholds 
with regard to investment changes. This empirical exercise was carried out with 
the use of panel data techniques, for both the short- and long-term perspective for 
all OECD countries, between 1980 and 2015.
The results achieved evidence the existence of certain tax-to-GDP thresholds. 
Specifically, some optimal values of tax items as a proportion of GDP maximise 
investment decisions. In particular, regarding the short-run, we found a maximis-
ing threshold for the promotion of long-run investment growth of 10.65% for 
taxes on individual income. On the other hand, we come to the conclusion eventu-
ally that maximum threshold levels to promote investment growth exist for taxes 
on firms’ profits and taxes on the consumption of goods and services, of 6.27% 
and 9.19%, respectively. Furthermore, we found a minimum threshold of 11.35% 
for social security contributions. 
With regards to the short-run, we only found one maximum threshold of 10.65% 
for taxes on individual income, while a minimum threshold value of 12.09% was 
found for social contributions. In addition, we found minimum threshold values, 
on average, of 7.37% and 14.18% for profits and consumption of goods and ser-
vices taxes, respectively.
These results are of extreme importance. They give new insights into the optimi-
sation of tax systems with respect to investment decisions. Consequently, several 
research lines could be pursued in the future to study deeper each tax source 
design in order to efficiently guarantee a tax that could ensure high levels of com-
pliance, without jeopardising investment decisions. Several other analyses could 
also be carried out with the objective of finding possible complementary or com-
peting roles between taxes and other macroeconomic variables. In sum, our article 
gives new insights that must be explored for a better understanding of tax systems.
Disclosure statement 


















































43 (3) 291-309 (2019)
307REFERENCES
1. Afonso, A. and Jalles, J. T., 2015. How Does Fiscal Policy Affect Investment? 
Evidence from a Large Panel. International Journal of Finance & Economics, 
4, pp. 310-327. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1518 
2. Afonso, A. and St. Aubyn, M., 2009. Macroeconomic Rates of Return of Pub-
lic and Private Investment: Crowding-in and Crowding-out Effects. The Man-
chester School, 77(s1), pp. 21-39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009. 
02117.x 
3. Alesina, A. and Ardagna, S., 2010. 2 Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes 
versus Spending. Tax Policy and the Economy, 24(1), pp. 35-68. https://doi.
org/10.1086/649828 
4. Arnold, J., 2008. Do Tax Structures Affect Aggregate Economic Growth? 
Empirical Evidence from a Panel of OECD Countries. OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 643.
5. Baliamoune-Lutz, M. and Garello, P., 2014. Tax structure and entrepreneur-
ship. Small Business Economics, 42(1), pp. 165-190. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11187-013-9469-9 
6. Barro, R. J. and Redlick, C. J., 2011. Macroeconomic Effects From Govern-
ment Purchases and Taxes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), pp. 
51-102. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjq002 
7. Bond, S. and Xing, J., 2015. Corporate taxation and capital accumulation: 
Evidence from sectoral panel data for 14 OECD countries. Journal of Public 
Economics, 130(Supplement C), pp. 15-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpu-
beco.2015.08.001 
8. Brandstetter, L. and Jacob, M., 2013. Do corporate tax cuts increase invest-
ments? Berlin: Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre. https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2362258 
9. Braunerhjelm, P. and Eklund, J., 2014. Taxes, tax administrative burdens and 
new firm formation. Kyklos, 67(1), pp. 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl. 
12040 
10. Cass, D., 1965. Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accu-
mulation. The Review of Economic Studies, 32(3), pp. 233-240. https://doi.
org/10.2307/2295827 
11. Da Rin, M., Di Giacomo, M. and Sembenelli, A., 2011. Entrepreneurship, firm 
entry, and the taxation of corporate income: Evidence from Europe. Journal of 
Public Economics, 95(9), pp. 1048-1066. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco. 
2010.06.010 
12. Da Rin, M., Sembenelli, A. and Di Giacomo, M., 2010. Corporate Taxation 
and the Size of New Firms: Evidence from Europe. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 8(2-3), pp. 606-616. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542- 
4774.2010.tb00530.x 
13. Djankov, S. [et al.], 2010. The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and 



















































43 (3) 291-309 (2019)
308 14. Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R. and  Timmer, M. P., 2015. The Next Generation of 
the Penn World Table. American Economic Review, 105(10), pp. 3150-3182. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130954 
15. Galindo, A. J., and Pombo, C., 2011. Corporate taxation, investment and pro-
ductivity: A firm level estimation. Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 5(7), 
pp. 158-161.
16. Gemmell, N. [et al.], 2016. Corporate Taxation and Productivity Catch-Up: 
Evidence from European Firms. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
120(2), pp. 372-399. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12212 
17. Grdinic, M., Drezgic, S. and Blazic, H., 2017. An Empirical Analysis of the 
Relationship between Tax Structures and Economic Growth in CEE Coun-
tries. Ekonomski časopis, pp. 426-447.
18. Jacob, M., Michaely, R. and Müller, M. A., 2017. Consumption Taxes and 
Corporate Investment. The Review of Financial Studies, pp. 1-39. https://doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2800146 
19. Koopmans, T., 1963. On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth. Cowles 
Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
20. Langenmayr, D., Haufler, A. and Bauer, C. J., 2015. Should tax policy favor 
high- or low-productivity firms? European Economic Review, 73(Supplement 
C), pp. 18-34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.10.005 
21. Lee, Y. and Gordon, R. H., 2005. Tax structure and economic growth. Journal 
of Public Economics, 89(5-6), pp. 1027-1043. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpu-
beco.2004.07.002 
22. Ljungqvist, A. and Smolyansky, M., 2016. To Cut or Not to Cut? On the 
Impact of Corporate Taxes on Employment and Income. Massachussets: 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
23. Ljungqvist, A., Zhang, L. and Zuo, L., 2017. Sharing Risk with the Govern-
ment: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 55(3), pp. 669-707. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12157 
24. Mertens, K. and Ravn, M. O., 2012. Empirical Evidence on the Aggregate 
Effects of Anticipated and Unanticipated US Tax Policy Shocks. American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2), pp. 145-181. https://doi.
org/10.1257/pol.4.2.145 
25. Mountford, A. and Uhlig, H., 2009. What are the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks? Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24(6), pp. 960-992. https://doi.
org/10.1002/jae.1079 
26. Mukherjee, A., Singh, M. and Žaldokas, A., 2017. Do corporate taxes hinder 
innovation? Journal of Financial Economics, 124(1), pp. 195-221. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.01.004 
27. Ramsey, F., 1928. A Mathematical Theory of Saving. The Economic Journal, 
38(152), pp. 543-559. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224098 
28. Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H., 2010. The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax 
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks. American 


















































43 (3) 291-309 (2019)
30929. Solow, R., 1956. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), pp. 65-94. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 
1884513 
30. Swan, T., 1956. Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation. Economic 
Record, 32(2), pp. 334-361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1956.tb00434.x 
31. Vergara, R., 2010. Taxation and private investment: evidence for Chile. Applied 
Economics, 42(6), pp. 717-725. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701720747 
32. Xing, J., 2010. Does tax structure affect economic growth? Empirical evi-
dence from OECD countries. Oxford University for Business Taxation, 
WP11/20, pp. 1-56.
